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Summary

This white paper explores a range of potentially attractive partnerships, including those
between established US industry members, the entrepreneurial CE (clean energy)
community, and the financial industry. These partnerships, include those that can leverage a
wide range of entrepreneurial and industry resources that are needed to promote the
development and commercialization of innovative new technologies - partnerships that in
turn can lead to accelerated, global utilization of CE, as well as US global leadership for the
CE industry. The need for these partnerships is discussed within the context of the growing
interest in CE, driven in large part by the anticipated strong, global growth in energy
demand, as well as by the need for a spectrum of other long term (e.g. environmental)
benefits from CE. The impacts of the rapidly changing investment and the market
environment for innovative CE technologies are also explored.
The strong need for multifaceted enabling partnerships and resources are found to go well
beyond those corresponding to financing, and includes for example, expertise on markets
and market creation, and product development. In addition, deep resource levels are often
especially needed in the pursuit of high potential, next generation CE innovative supply
technologies that require costly technology development. Such is the case for example,
where sophisticated manufacturing approaches are needed to exploit promising, and high
performance, material combinations along with novel and complex technology based
hardware. Further, access to adequate resources for the needed, high cost, technology
development is increasingly less likely to be available from traditional partners such as VCs
and their limited partners.
Of the key potential partners explored, Strategic Industry Partners (SIPs) are found to be
particularly intriguing - they have the most robust range of appropriate resources to
potentially benefit from these partnerships while also helping to fill the void in the
commercialization food chain for technology development, where VC funding is not
available. SIPs also play a broad enabling role for the growth of the entrepreneurial US
based, CE industry. Moreover, SIPs also have the required stature and influence to impact
global markets as well as to promote global US leadership in CE, while also contributing to
the dialogue around public-private partnerships. While SIPs have stringent requirements for
partnering, as well as intense competition for their resource investments, successfully
pursuing mutually attractive partnerships with SIPs should be well worth the required effort.
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Executive Summary
This White Paper explores a variety of partnership models including those between established
US industry members, the entrepreneurial CE (clean energy) community, and the financial
industry. The need for new partnership options is driven by a growing demand for power and by
the massive investment requirements of the burgeoning clean energy industry as well as by the
race to develop and bring to market second and third generation technologies to a globally
competitive marketplace. In particular, there is a need for partnership options that can not only a
leverage a range of financing options (which are always a core need), but that also include
expertise on technology, market creation, manufacturing, product development, regulatory
processes and infrastructure.
Quite importantly, partnerships that leverage and support global US leadership are needed to
address for example long times to market, large expenditures for technology development,
market uncertainties, portfolio risks, and regulatory risks associated with new energy supply
technologies.
Five key conclusions emerge from our examination of clean energy commercialization
investment trends and the benefits of various partnership models:
1. The current CE investment community will not be able to meet the industries
demand for long-term, capital-intensive investments. Much CE investment is moving
downstream (to investments having negligible technical risk), resulting in a
corresponding gap in the upstream commercialization food chain - SolarCity is a good
example of this downstream investment trend where the technology is well vetted.1 This
gap, or upstream investment shortfall, is caused largely by the mismatch between the
current venture capital / limited partner (VC/LP) model, and the often very large
investments and long times to market needed for the development and thorough vetting
of many CE energy supply technologies.2
2. U.S. leadership could stagnate from a lack of investment in the building blocks of
next generation technology. The shift to downstream investment has potentially far
reaching impacts and could limit or prevent the upstream innovation and development of
many next generation CE hardware technologies. This is especially true next generation
CE energy supply technologies and in particular those that require the application of new
materials and configurations, as well as the development of sophisticated manufacturing
processes. These next generation CE supply technologies are needed to foster continued
US world leadership in CE market development as well as the long term global
competitiveness of the CE industry in the US.
1

Downstream, for our discussion here, refers to ventures that use key technical innovations that are currently in the
marketplace; these key technical innovations have been vetted to the extent no significant technology development
is needed – though market based product development and engineering is often still be required. For example,
SolarCity uses market ready photovoltaic cells and panels from a range of suppliers in its installations, for its scaleable solar installation, service and financing business.
2
The VC/LP model as explained in our discussion below is operative and most effective for ventures that are
platform opportunities and that do not require large capital investments and long times to markets; e.g. these include
ventures that, for example, are based on software, IT, and social media (e.g. Nest).
i
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On the positive side, the downstream focus has resulted in some dramatic successes and
achievements for the commercialization of well vetted CE technologies (see conclusion 5
for further discussion of this issue). Thus emphasis on both downstream and upstream
portions of the commercialization pipeline are needed.
3. Strategic Industry Partners (SIPs) and Institutional Investors represent the most
attractive partnering opportunities to address a good portion of the investment
shortfall. While, SIPs are well positioned to jointly benefit from providing the wide
swath resources for bridging this resource gap,3 partnerships between SIPs and CE
Ventures with innovative technologies are particularly intriguing, if the partners can
complement and leverage each other’s core strengths and needs.4 For instance, to meet
long-term strategic objectives (e.g. enhanced profitability, global industry leadership)
many SIPs want new investment opportunities and product innovations (along with the
corresponding expertise) that entrepreneurial ventures can provide. Moreover, SIPs also
have the required stature and influence to impact global markets as well as to promote
global US leadership in CE as they help enable the growth of the entrepreneurial US
based, CE industry, while also contributing to the dialogue around public-private
partnerships.
Another major strength of SIPs is that they have the ability to bridge across numerous
segments of the commercialization food chain; and well structured partnerships, that
provide a more robust portfolio of options along this food chain that can help reduce risks
and investment costs to all participants. That said, other Institutional Investors will
continue to be important to provide further robustness to the commercialization food
chain through syndication of investment resources even more broadly. This is important
because of the size of the investment the inherent risk.
4. The U.S. Government has an essential role to play in facilitating, and in
participating in this process. Public-private partnerships will be crucial to the robust
development and accelerated deployment of new cost effective energy innovations. Areas
of particular importance include continued development of policies and effective
incentives (e.g. the reliability of incentives is quite important to reduce investment
uncertainties), programmatic technology investments that feed the new technology
pipeline and, in promoting novel ways of participating in the investment CE
commercialization ecosystem.
5. New financial innovations will support these new partnerships. A number of financial
innovations, corresponding to downstream commercialization of CE technologies, are
already being deployed and are rapidly accelerating the deployment of well vetted CE
3

For instance, SIPs often have large financial resources (that give them the capability to structure investments using
a variety of debt, and equity instruments). SIPs also have strong technical expertise including that for manufacturing
(and the associated facilities), in addition to well established know-how for market creation, supply chain
management, and infrastructure development.
4
For example SIPs have strong competition (internally especially) for their resources they often have other stringent
requirements to help reduce risks; e.g. they always look protect their brand, as well as to improve operations.
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technologies. For instance, as referenced above SolarCity has been a leader in developing
leasing and power purchase agreements (PPAs) as well as for helping to create a CE asset
class and a viable bond rating system while providing securitization of project
investments through these leases for CE systems. Some have called these recent
achievements groundbreaking.
On the other hand intriguing opportunities that can address the resource shortfall
mentioned above for earlier stage investments are emerging. For example there is
growing interest by long term institutional investors (LTIs) who typically seek larger, and
longer term investments (e.g. in the $50 -500 Million range) and who believe that by
taking more direct control of their investments, they can improve their capital investment
efficiency, reduce overall costs and lessen agency problems.5 LTIs are also often expert
at dealing with infrastructure investments along with their inherent commodity like
returns. They plan to do this while leveraging expertise and resources from partners such
as SIPs, and public sector entities, as well as top VCs. The VCs for instance contribute
their vetting (and selection), as well as start-up management, skills.
Finally, we bring this summary discussion to a close with a few brief observations regarding
some rapidly occurring opportunities and challenges are greatly impacting CE
commercialization; e.g. the evolution of the natural gas and electric utility industries.

5

There is an Alliance of these funds which is still in its infancy. For instance, one member the New Zealand Super
Fund (NZSF), a sovereign wealth fund that uses this newly evolving model, has recently made three investments
(totaling more than $150Million) in US based technology ventures have not completed their technology
development.
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Clean Energy - Bridging to Commercialization: The
Key Potential Role of Large Strategic Industry
Partners
A Summary White Paper

Introduction
There is a growing consensus that Clean Energy (CE) is an increasingly important component of
the US energy portfolio. Critical drivers that call for increased development and application of
innovative CE energy technologies include those that help meet the relentless growing global
energy demand, as well as those that foster economic growth, energy security, regional portfolio
requirements, and climate change goals. In the US, which is sometimes cited as being the most
attractive market in the world,6 there recently has been growing interest a range of industry
members (e.g. Apple, Walmart, Google, GM, and Verizon etc.) to adopt existing well vetted, or
downstream7 CE technologies8 to meet business objectives such as for powering information
technology (IT) centers, backup power,
Table -1. Some Key Resource Allies Reviewed
and distributed generation. Beyond the
US, the use of CE technologies is
• Strategic Industry Partners (SIPs)
growing even faster in developed
• Strategic Industry Investors (SIIs)
regions such as Japan and Australia.
• Large Industry Users of CE Technology
Further growth is most vigorous in parts
• VCs and Limited Partners
of the developing world—such as in
• Dedicated Private Equity (PE) firms
China, India, Saudi Arabia, and many
• DOD / DOE
Latin American countries, where
• Crowdfunding
increasing costs associated with more
• Long Term Institutional (LTI) Investors
conventional centralized technologies is
of growing concern.
• Utilities
•

Family Offices

The amount of CE technologies
currently deployed, while growing, is still quite small relative to that from conventional energy
technologies, thus leaving a large economic (including job growth) opportunity to exploit for
expanding CE markets. On the positive side this opportunity is being recognized by numerous
6

See for example: Meehan, C. (May 31,2013). “US Now Most Attractive Market for Renewable Energy, Finds
Ernst & Young.” Renewable Energy World. While the US is still number one, China is gaining fast; for an updated
(2014) data base go to URL. http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/RECAI_40__February_2014/$FILE/EY_RECAI%2040_Feb%202014.pdf
7
Downstream, for our discussion here, refers to ventures that use key technical innovations that are currently in the
marketplace, and have established business models; these key technical innovations have been vetted to the extent
no significant technology development is needed – though market based product development and engineering is
often still be required. For example, SolarCity uses market ready photovoltaic cells and panels from a range of
suppliers in its installations, for its scale-able solar installation, service and financing business. Conversely,
upstream efforts, in our terminology emphasize providing technology innovations and resolving a host of R&D
issue, across a range of technology development stages - from concept development, to the scale-up and verification
of key manufacturing processes.
8
Some users like Google also invest upstream in the development of the innovative CE technologies.
1

global financial giants which are increasingly participating in US markets. For example
Goldman Sachs is making significant investment commitments in CE.9 In addition large
investment firms like MidAmerica Renewables (part of Berkshire Hathaway Holdings), CITI,
Morgan Stanley, and Bank of America are boosting confidence in utility scale power through
their investments,10 while the maturation and progress in the investment and deployment of other
renewables continues apace.11
While the global opportunity is large, developing a robust pipeline of next generation US based
CE technologies to pursue this opportunity, is accompanied by a range of challenges. These
challenges extend far beyond access to lower cost capital, and include those related to gaining an
entre to resources for innovative technology development, the development of markets and
market channels, distribution networks, and supply chain management systems. Moreover, while
assuming a desire for US global leadership in this arena, it is important to recognize that the size
of the resources needed for effective global competition by US industry is often much greater
than a single entity can readily garner. For example, even though many large industry members
have strong cash positions and the ability to pursue acquisitions and mergers, and other kinds of
investments in CE, 12 the resource needs to address the challenges effectively will require
mutually beneficial partnerships, that leverage contributions and assets from many entities
including existing large US industry members, the entrepreneurial CE industry, the financial
industry, and the public sector, to address a host of commercialization issues and other barriers.
Our target audience for this white paper is eclectic, though we place emphasize on entrepreneurs
where we provide an overview of key current options and trends for attracting funding, and a
host of other resources, along with strategies to secure same. Also, for example regarding
strategic industry partners, we focus on the use and potential business opportunities provided by
complimenting SIP resources with CE innovations, while addressing SIP needs, and
requirements. Further, relative to the public-private sector, we provide insight on potential
opportunities for, and the value of promoting, robust support for partnerships with large SIPs,
and the CE innovation community, as well as other entities such as utiliites.
With the above as background and context, as well as the detailed assessments in the body of the
report, we provide five key conclusions below. More specifically, these conclusions largely
derive from our exploration of the key challenges, along with their implications, as well as on
opportunities to more effectively bridge to the required resources through partnerships. Also,
while emphasizing large industry partners, we looked at a range of potential partners that are
particularly relevant to upstream commercialization needs, as well as to the transition to
downstream commercialization resources. A key objective is to identify partnership opportunities

9

See: Reuters. (February, 2014). “Goldman Sachs Group Inc plans to channel investments totaling $40 billion over
the next decade into renewable energy.” Reuters. URL http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/23/goldman-greenidUSL1E8GMDPR20120523
10
For example, solar and wind (combined) represent more than 40% of recent utility capacity increases.
11
See: Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF (2013). Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2013.
(Frankfurt am Main). URL http://fs-unep-centre.org/sites/default/files/attachments/gtr2013keyfindings.pdf
12
See for example: ChiefExecutive.net (October 4 2012). “10 Companies with the Biggest Cash Stockpiles in
America.” CEO Briefing Newsletter. URL. http://chiefexecutive.net/10-companies-with-the-biggest-cash-stockpilesin-america#sthash.b5vxUKqN.dpuf 6
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that can demonstrably improve both the continuity and robustness of the CE commercialization
ecosystem.

Five Key Conclusions Discussed
1. There is a growing gap in the upstream commercialization food chain for many CE
innovations caused by the shift of many VCs and their limited partners to more
profitable, and lower risk, downstream
ventures.13 Thus CE Entrepreneurs will likely find
it increasingly difficult to access the needed funding
and other key resources for their CE innovations via
14
over thethe
past few
years, but still has a way
to go to return
to pre-1995 levels.
If  it’s  true  Examples of
VC/limited
limited
partner
route.
that too much capital is dragging down returns, money should be flowing out of VC until
returnsthe
normalize.
Despiteto
more
than a decade of poor returns
relative to publicly traded
shift
downstream
investment,
where
stocks, however, there appears to be only a modest retrenchment by LPs. We wonder:
development
risksunderperformance?
are almost nil,
why aretechnology
LPs so committed to investing
in VC despite its persistent
include
Silver
Lake’s
investment
LP hopes for VC returns are high, and those hopes fuel new money into VC in
fundsSolarCity, the
nationwide. A Probitas Partners survey of nearly 300 institutional investors found that
merger
between
SunPower
and Total,
two-thirds
of investors expect
a 2x+ multiple
from top quartile, early-stage
VC funds. and the
Contrary to those lofty expectations, Cambridge Associates data show that during the
acquisition
of
Albeo
by
GE.
In
each
case the key
twelve-year period from 1997 to 2009, there have been only five vintage years in which
15 investor capital, let alone doubled it. It’s  
Figure 1. Cleantech Funding by
medianCE
VC funds
generated
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that
returned
technologies had been well vetted, negating
notable that these poor returns have persisted through several market cycles: the
Stage and Quarter, 2010-2013,
Internetthe
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Source: Cambridge Associates, 2010 Benchmark Report, vintage year 1990–2009 funds
(http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=78&Itemid=102).

The chart below shows us that top quartile fund returns since 1998 hover around
breakeven, but the bottom quartile generates only negative returns since 1996. This
Figure 2. LIMITED PARTNERS “The
performance gap between the top and bottom quartiles highlights the importance of GP
Fund
Barely
Returns
selection.Average
The historic difference
between
top- and bottom-quartile
IRRsInvestor
demonstrates
that only a few high-performing  GPs  help  to  generate  the  expected  high  “venture  rate  of  

Capital After Fees”

8

NVCA Yearbook, 2011; NVCA VC Fundraising Q4 2011 press release at
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=78&Itemid=102.
9
Probitas Partners, Private Equity Market Review and Institutional Investor Trends Survey for 2010,
http://probitaspartners.com/alternative_investments_publications/white-papers-and-surveys.html.

Central to the formation and growth of the gap is
the growing tendency of most upstream financiers
(e.g. VCs) to avoid investing in a significant
amount upstream technology development,
especially for the frequently costly and time
consuming manufacturing scale-up, and the
corresponding verification process for potentially
disruptive technologies. Nor have VCs been
investing in technology development for
disruptive technologies where long times to
market magnify market uncertainties. This
situation is particularly pronounced where new
materials and material combinations are deployed
in novel technology configurations.16,17 Quite

13

As discussed in the white paper, VCs do still invest
upstream in CE in areas like energy efficiency, IT, software,
16
social media related to CE, as well and in other areas, where significant risky technology development is not needed,
and where sufficiently large markets exist.
14
For example see in Figure 1, how early stage VC investment has decreased dramatically recently. URL.
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/technology/publications/assets/pwc-moneytree-cleantech-venture-funding-q42013.pdf
15
SolarCity has a disruptive, scale-able service / installation, and financing business model, but the technology as
noted above is not disruptive.
16
Such requirements can make it nearly impossible for VC funds to satisfy their nominal “sweet spot target” of 10X
return, an exit within the 7-10years, while having an initial product in the market place in about 3 years into the
investment. To this point, several large profile VC firms, which focus on building $Billion businesses have
essentially exited the space; and many more have severely curtailed their investment efforts in CE.

3

importantly, this movement away from investments by VCs in upstream technology
development is caused by other considerations including the fact that many clean energy
investments (including numerous high profile ones) have not been able to generate the
needed downstream ROIs over the last 10 years required to provide reasonably good
profitability for their limited partners; limited partners are typically the primary source the
investment dollars needed and used by VCs. This low profitability for limited partners is
strikingly illustrated in the Figure 2 above, from the Kaufman Fund Report;18,19 see data from
1999 through 2008.
Other key interrelated problems have conspired to greatly reduce the profitability of many
upstream technology investments and thus limit the future availability of investments. These
problems include the fact that there has often been too much initial optimism in how quickly
markets will, or can grow,20 as well as the general global economic malaise and the credit
crunch which began in late 2007. In addition, the current volatile and often lower prices for
competing commodity energy sources (e.g. Natural Gas), and the decrease in government
funding to help buy down these risks all contribute to the above problems.
Hence, with all of these issues (and risks) cited above, and lack of current high demand in
much of the market place (especially in the US) there is not enough incentive for VCs and
their LPs to take on the risks associated with disruptive energy supply technologies that
require expensive and lengthy technology development.
Finally, we should mention why Private Equity (PE) Firms (e.g. like Silver Lake) don’t provide
equity funding, especially in the form of Growth Equity (GrE) in this gap. PE firms traditionally
invest in the growth of the business (e.g. SolarCity), and in product development as needed, but
they strongly avoid technology risk associated with the development of the base technology.
Also, to qualify for PE/GrE funding, the technology based venture typically must have products /
services in the marketplace, and in many cases must have solid cash flow. 21
2. The gap in the commercialization food chain can have far reaching impacts on the CE
innovation pipeline over the longer term. This is important because continued innovation
is needed to accelerate market driven deployment of a wide range of CE technologies that
can address global growing energy needs in the most cost effective manner.
17

Consider the experiences of A123, and MiaSole. In both cases, as the technology was being fast tracked to
commercialization, significant manufacturing technology development issues arose, along with reliability problems.
This resulted in not being able to meet cost/performance requirements and projected time to market, as well as
market share– and both ran out of money followed by bankruptcy, with big losses for investors.
18
Mulcahy, D.; Weeks, B.; Bradley, H.S. (May 2012). “WE HAVE MET THE ENEMYAND HE IS US: Lessons
from Twenty Years of the Kauffman Foundation’s Investments in Venture Capital Funds and The Triumph of Hope
over Experience.” Ewing Marion Kaufman Foundation. URL http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/vc-enemy-isus-report.pdf
19
It is important to note that these results from the Kaufman study are not limited to CE investments.
20
Consider the experiences of A123, and MiaSole20. In both cases, as the technology was being fast tracked to
commercialization, significant manufacturing technology development issues arose, along with reliability problems.
This resulted in not being able to meet cost/performance requirements and projected time to market, as well as
market share– and both ran out of money followed by bankruptcy, with big losses for investors.
21
Hence, GrE does not address the expensive upstream technology development issues such as those related to scale
up of manufacturing for which is discussed extensively above. See Appendix F

4

On the positive side, this downstream focus has given CE innovations considerable traction
and acceptance in the current marketplace. Moreover, these recent, downstream based
contributions have led to the growth of the industry, based primarily on first generation
technologies22 (e.g. SolarCity). And, this downstream focus also often also addresses
infrastructure development. Further it is leading to new financing innovations and
platforms,23 such as the broader application of Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) as
discussed below, and the evolution of new relationships with Utilities such as those that are
occurring with distributed generation and net metering. In addition this focus has helped to
establish the securitization of solar energy contracts, and the creation of green energy funds
including bonds.24 And these secured Green bonds, while rapidly becoming popular, are
concurrently creating a market asset class for CE, helping to reduce transaction costs.
Conversely, not addressing the technology
development gap effectively can severely limit or
prevent the development and commercialization25
PV Module Experience Curve: 1976 -2012!
of many worthy upstream CE technology
innovations such as depicted in Figure 3,26 for PV
modules.
These innovations also include those needed for
enabling, next generation, and dramatically more
cost effective CE supply technologies such as novel
wind turbine, battery, fuel cell, ocean, and energy
storage, systems – these, often disruptive CE supply
technologies, can often require and/or leverage
Cumulative!Capacity!(MW)!!
novel material configurations, along with complex
hardware development as well as innovative, and
Figure 4. Equity Gap for Next
sophisticated manufacturing processes.
Generation CE “Supply
Figure 3. Fostering Next Generation
Technology Development
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Also, since there is a mismatch between VC/LP
model and very large investments, (as explained in
Conclusion 1, above), the anticipation of not being
able to complete the transition to the downstream
commercialization process will preclude investment
in the early upstream process (as depicted in Figure
4.).27
22

Technologies”

Of course, contributions such as those that are based on combining first, and future generations of CE
technologies with software and IT innovations, are quite important and should be fostered.
23
Examples include numerous crowdfunding approaches such as for SolarCity (discussed below), Clean Power
Finance, Noesis, and many others.
24
See: Doom, Justin (Jul 25, 2014 ). Million in Bonds Backed by Panels. Bloomberg. Bloomberg News . URL
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-25/solarcity-raises-201-5-million-in-bonds-backed-by-panels.html
25
We also discuss later, how this gap severely limits access to resources from other dedicated private equity (PE)
firms – the vast majority of which do not invest in technology research and development (see Appendix F).
26
While Figure 3, as reported by Maycock, shows progress in terms of cost vs cumulative capacity produced
corresponding to 1st and 2nd generation PV technology (and thus to a great extent the impact of manufacturing
scale), there is no apparent path to the next generation cells/modules in the current investment environment.
27
For further discussion on this gap, and earlier work on “the Cash Flow Valley of Death.” See also Appendix A (
Inherent Challenges Within The Investment Gap).
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In addition, the movement of VCs and their limited partners away from investments that
require large capital expenditures represents much more than just a loss of access to capital
for CE innovations. It also includes the loss of the traditionally important contributions by
VCs to the management and business growth expertise, as well as to start-up, and operational
support for nascent CE technology ventures. Further, and quite importantly, the result of not
making the upstream innovation pipeline more robust is likely to cause the US to cede its CE
leadership to non-US based industry members and investors28 in the global economy, not
only for the manufacture of new CE technology innovations, but also for their creation (and
the associated intellectual property), development, and integration within the larger US
energy infrastructure. Thus, the need for new kinds of resource partnerships is emerging;
partnerships that will play an increasingly important role in helping to close this gap and to
foster continued industry growth and development - as well as US industry leadership in CE.
3. Large Strategic Industry Partners SIPs are potentially the best positioned group to
benefit from providing a bridge to resources, eliminating the gap discussed above for
CE - resources that span a wide range of upstream and downstream commercialization needs
- if strong business cases, can be made relative to the many other investment options that
SIPs have.
SIPS CAN PROVIDE INTEGRATED EXPERTISE
AND ACCESS TO MANY RESOURCES

In particular SIPs can provide access to a wide
spectrum of expertise and other resources, if
Technology
Markets
strong market demand for the products, along
with the ability and willingness of customers to
SIPs
buy the products all exist. These resources
include: (i) access to capital, (ii) technology and
Capital
Vertical Integration
product expertise, iii) access to, and
Supply chain mgmt
understanding of markets, (iv) supply chain
development and management, and (v) their
Figure 5. SIPs can provide
ability to Impact market and industry stability as
integrated expertise and access to
many resources
well as the dialogue on policy. Moreover, the
ability of SIPs29 to vertically integrate a
complex array of key resources and provide supply chain management is often world class.30
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See for example, related discussions of Mia Sole, and A123 in Appendix C.
We should also make a distinction between SIPs and Strategic Industry Investors (SIIs), as there can be some key
differences in the objectives of each. For instance, SIIs may have as their primary focus the financial return aspects
(including time constraints) of the investment itself, while not being as tightly tied to the longer term strategic needs
of the industry member that they represent. Further, even if a particular SII represents the industry member’s venture
arm, and also is a limited partner to a venture fund, the other fund members will likely be looking for VC-like
returns and timing, along with some (usually minority) shared controlling interest. Moreover, if the SII is making a
direct investment in a CE venture, the SII may require a controlling interest that could enable the SII to change the
future course of the venture.
30
Another major strength of SIPs is that they have the ability to bridge across numerous segments of the
commercialization food chain; and well structured partnerships, that provide a more robust portfolio of options
along this food chain that can, in turn, help reduce risks and investment costs to all participants.
29
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Key SIP Resource Area 1 - Access to Capital. SIPs can be a potential source of private
capital investment, in the gap between traditional VC and Private Equity sources by
potentially offering a wider range of options relative to what VC or PE investors can offer
individually. Of course SIPs, have their own set of requirements and criteria for investment
including for instance, their internal hurdle rates, cost of capital, and appetites for risk that
must be evaluated by the venture seeking
Table 2. Cost of Capital by Selected Sectors –
to partner. In addition SIPs, because of
NYU Stern School of Business, 1/30/14
their industry stature, along with their
market knowledge and understanding of
market risks, can often attract other
traditional and non-traditional capital
(e.g. such as that from PE, family
offices, banks, foreign investors) which
is often more patient, and lower cost (see
Table 2) when compared to the cost of
capital available from purely financial
(e.g. VC and PE) investors.31 This is
because SIPs look for sound long term
investments which can lead to better
capital efficiency including the ability to
use debt to complement equity where
appropriate. Further, SIPs are often not
hamstrung by needing to cross investor
category boundaries along the
commercialization value chain; e.g. they
have the ability to span VC, a wide
range of other PE, and even project
financing.
SIPs, very importantly, also have the potential to promote more timely exits for (and coinvestment with) VCs and other earlier stage investors, that have the venture in their
investment portfolio; and they can catalyze, worthy potential mergers or acquisitions. These
exits and partnerships can take the form of buying the innovative venture or the technology
outright, licensing the technology, and / or purchasing the technology for the products
produced by the respective SIPs.
Key SIP Resource Area 2 - Technology and Product Expertise. SIPs can potentially offer
joint product development with small entrepreneurial companies, while greatly enhancing
product and market acceptability through their market place reputation as well as expertise.
They may also provide crucial continuity, including that for manufacturing, in the innovation
pipeline. They also bring deep understanding of technology infrastructure needs, including
those related to input and off-take opportunities. Further they are often a good source of
31

For many corporates WACC provides a floor above which value is created. For full list of Sectors see: NYU Stern
Business School (January, 2014). “Cost of Capital by Sector.” URL
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/wacc.htm. Interestingly, by Comparison,
Morningstar recently reported (as of 1/31/13) a 10 year average trailing return on the S&P 500 index of less than
7.5%. Of course VCs and PE firms seek much larger returns.
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knowledge on related competitor technology. They also bring a broad and valuable rolodex,
including a support network to enhance access to a wide range of potential partners (e.g.
those needed for manufacturing, project development, etc.). Thus, they can provide a
commercialization pathway that is likely to be much more robust, and accelerated than that
which a small CE entrepreneurial company can implement on its own – important since for
example, time to market is so crucial in the fast-paced global environment.
Many potential SIP partners bring strong technical expertise and know-how related to large
scale, and sophisticated manufacturing,32 along with know-how to optimally translate
manufacturing learning processes into cost reductions - reductions that are crucial to the
successful commercialization of potentially attractive CE technology hardware innovations.
Such innovations as noted above often require complex new configurations and material
combinations. This manufacturing know-how is also crucial for downstream efforts that must
focus on evolving, market focused products that leverage other attractive complimentary
technology innovations.
Key Resource Area 3 - Understanding Of Markets and Competition, and more specifically
the relentless focus that SIPs have on related markets and market needs is a key capability of
SIPs. SIPs are not going to risk their resources or reputation on business partnerships that
don’t make sense or that don’t help them compete more effectively in the marketplace.
For instance SIPs can provide CE company partners with insight on customer development,
as well as the potential opportunity to leverage the SIP’s marketing channels and (often
world class) distribution networks. Moreover, SIPs not only have a very good sense of
markets for their current product offerings as well as how to create markets for those
offerings, they will also likely offer additional insights on promising new innovations and the
corresponding products and markets for which they and the new venture can jointly bring to
the table. In fact, it is the value added collaboration with SIPs in defining and developing
new markets for the innovations from new venture, that is likely to be one of the most
important and attractive features of any such partnership, especially if the resulting benefits
accrue fairly to all parties.
Furthermore, SIPs bring market credibility for jointly developed products through welldesigned partnerships. And quite importantly, these partnerships can promote more rapid
access to markets, as well as greatly accelerate the time to market and ultimate profitability
from innovative technology in the marketplace (e.g. decreases in the time to develop and
access markets may be as much as an order of magnitude).
Key SIP Resource Area 4 - Access To, Understanding and Integration of Key Supply
Chain Elements. SIPs’ many insights, and experience with needed supply chain elements,
can greatly help their partners gain access to the market place at an accelerated pace. It is the
ability of these large corporations to combine and integrate these capabilities and resources,
32

This need could be extremely important to the future development and commercialization of innovative new
technologies, that require large CAPEX, and manufacturing scale-up development, and longer times to market. See
Appendix C: The Technology Cost/Performance and Investment Challenges Can Be More Daunting Than Many
Have Believed - Especially In The Manufacturing And Scale-Up Regimes of Commercialization.
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that make SIP involvement so compelling – and SIPs can do this for a wide range of
upstream and downstream commercialization efforts as discussed above.
SIP expertise and know-how with supply chains is especially important for complex energy
systems for developers of major complex energy components and systems that will most
likely require multiple partnerships with many suppliers. These suppliers and partners
include for example, those for key components and subcomponents, different funding
sources, and product development services, as well as those partners corresponding to
various market channels, and distribution networks. Even when the specific SIP does not
have the needed expertise in house, they often have extensive networks, that include the
needed value chain participants. This last point is noteworthy since big companies (e.g. GE,
Exxon, and Utilities) often control relatively large portions of the energy industry, as well as
the corresponding key supply chain elements, and market channels.
Key SIP Resource Area 5 - SIPs can make valuable contributions to Policy and Regulatory
Dialogue. SIPs can have an impact significantly beyond their wide-ranging resources, their
market focus, and their business and technical expertise. For instance, it their stature, and
credibility in the international business community is important. And while large corporates
are focused first on their fiduciary responsibilities, they often also have a much broader and
longer-term perspective than just short term financial aspects of their own, and related
industries. They also have informed perspectives of the needs, challenges, and opportunities
that are likely to emerge as a result of Policy (and regulatory) decisions. For instance they
have knowledgeable perspectives on the impact that policy is likely to have on specific
market and related industry stability. Thus, SIPs, are well positioned to make valuable
contributions to policy and regulatory dialogue relative to the commercialization of CE and
the larger energy context for the benefit of all.
Moreover, by building on their position of stature and influence, SIPs, when aligned with the
entrepreneurial CE community, will be key in helping to sustain and grow US global
leadership in CE, while contributing to market stability. However, while building those
partnerships can be daunting as will be discussed briefly below, developing an understanding
of SIP perspectives and the context in which they operate, and successfully addressing their
key needs (all of which shape their decision processes) can be well worth the required effort.
Key SIP Perspectives and Needs. For example SIP virtually all large companies are now
international and they must adjust to global competition. SIP also have strategic perspectives
can have time horizons that extend fifty years or more, even though SIP leadership may
periodically change over time. Also, while some potential SIPs, may have interests limited to
a particular CE technology (or piece of technology, such as a PV inverter), some the big
companies may have a wide portfolio of interests specific to different operating units; for
instance GE, beyond their many technology product lines, have noted that they are willing to
collaboratively share market channels, and distribution networks when doing so is congruent
with their strategic objectives. Also SIPs, when considering strategic partnerships, will
always look to protect their corporate brand and their corporate image; and they will require
clear access to the technologies that they look for. In addition, they need to perceive that any
specific CE partnership investment is at least as good a strategic fit, as their other available
investment opportunities. And SIPs need to see a clear picture of how such benefits will be
9

monetized, and accrue to them, both for short term and longer term objectives. Further SIPs
look for, and need, to see how the proposed innovations will then help them make their
respective businesses more robust. SIPs often look first for solutions to their current business
operation problems,33 along with the ability to leverage their strategic platforms and
competencies. Finally, if SIPs are going to be involved in technology development, they like
to get involved early while having clear agreements on access to the technology.
SIPs can have a number of key concerns that need to be addressed (or at least understood)
before entering into partnerships with entrepreneurial CE ventures. And according to one
citation, which is consistent with the downstream investment focus that we are currently
seeing, “The drivers are going to (have to) change to be much less environmental, and much
more business-related.” SIPs also have concerns about, and need to address, what they
perceive as the over-hyping of renewables, and the relatively large incentives that CE
technologies get. They also have significant reservations regarding how the uncertainty in
policy and regulations and their corresponding impact on markets,34 will impact the long
term profitability for their businesses.
Regarding key needs, SIPs need to know that for the technologies that they invest in, that
ultimately there is high likelihood that they will be in strong demand within the market place,
where large numbers of customers want them, and are willing to pay, and can afford them;35
they also want to know just how their own companies can profit from developing and
bringing specific CE technology products to market. SIPs also want their decision processes
to be supported by strong analytics using the best available information,36 and strong due
diligence. They also want the ability to address critical issues such as what the actual size of
the addressable markets might be, as well as the right time for market entry (e.g. now, or 10
years from now?).37 And SIPs need sound analysis to help understand the impacts from a
range of policy and regulation issues.
Finally, in summary regarding SIPs, many have the money and other key resources to make
the needed investments in CE for widespread adoption of these technologies, and many SIPs
are currently looking for profitable investment opportunities. Assuming interest in new
energy investment opportunities, they SIPs will also need innovations and the expertise
(technical and market) that good entrepreneurial ventures possess. While there is rapidly
changing environment for energy innovations, there are many growth opportunities,

33

Investment results in such cases (e.g. such as in energy efficiency) often accrue directly to the bottom line; and the
impact of these solutions are often more transparent, as well as convincing, to corporate decision makers.
34
A related and important perspective that SIPs have is that government set policy and help develop enabling
innovations, businesses create markets – not governments.
35
For instance, see Dr. William F. Banholzer’s, Executive Vice President and CTO of Dow Chemical Company,
talk. Banholzer, W (February, 2012). "The Future of Alternative Feedstocks and Biofuels: Recognizing Hype and
Realizing Practical Limitations," Presentation to the Chemical Engineering Department at UC Berkeley. URL
www.youtube.com/watch?v=W94210OvvWw
36
The best available information, is often not in a form, or sufficiently vetted (e.g. the continued downward cost
trend, anticipated relative stability of CE costs over the long term) such that is easily usable by prospective strategic
partner SIPs.
37
There are a host of other technology specific issues that are evolving rapidly, such as amount of electrical storage
that is actually needed, all of which must be addressed with analytics. See Appendix D for a few examples.
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including a growing interest and demand for these technologies and their corresponding
broad portfolio of benefits, especially internationally.
4. Public - private partnerships, will be crucial to the robust development and deployment
of new energy innovations, as well as to the ability to engage large US industry partners
in this effort,38 even while keeping in mind that businesses have the ultimate responsibility
in creating markets. This is true even assuming that large equity investments for technology
development, via Public-private partnerships are not likely to be available in the foreseeable
future. For example, while recognizing the differences in missions and the corresponding
perspectives of the public and private sector, it is especially important to minimize
uncertainties regarding issues such as regulations and government incentives. These issues
are vital to market stability, as well as for engaging large US industry and a wide range of
commercialization partners, and for the global US leadership role in CE. In fact a number of
CEOs of large US businesses have noted that their largest concern is the predictability of US
policy; some say it can be more important than the level of incentives, especially over the
long term.
Examples of novel policy legislation on the horizon, and which are quite important,
especially for downstream commercialization of CE technologies, include those that are
being considered for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT’s) and Master Limited
Partnerships (MLPs).39,40 If enacted (Senate and house versions exist), this legislation could
potentially enable risk reducing mechanisms, and other significant cost savings that are
currently reserved for investment in conventional energy. This and other similar legislation
could be key in maintaining the strong momentum that has been building in downstream
commercialization of CE.
5. A number of other potentially good partnership opportunities for financial, and other
resources have been identified. While, none has the breadth and depth of commercialization
resources when compared to SIPs (as discussed above), each has its own area of potential
applicability for developing partnerships (most correspond to down stream
commercialization) each is evolving, and progress in each of the areas should be tracked. For
example we briefly describe three of these areas below:
o Crowd Funding is interesting because of the potentially powerful ability to aggregate, and
scale financing (and access to other resources) by leveraging the internet and social
media for both equity-based and debt-based financing. And the industry is growing
rapidly; investments totaling $5B is anticipated for 2013, up from $1.2B in 2012. While
38

For a good discussion on the historical importance of promoting interplay between various members of industry
and public sector see: Janeway, W.H. (Oct 8, 2012). Doing Capitalism in the Innovation Economy: Markets,
Speculation and the State. Cambridge University Press. P79.
39
We should note also that there are other forms of securitization where accredited investors such as pension funds
would be able to participate and the potential influx of funds could reduce the cost of money as well. Climate or
Green bonds have been developing nicely overseas. There was a large bond offering last year to finance a large wind
farm also. Further, SolarCity just had a small (solar lease securitization) bond issuance to accredited investors with
the bonds covered by the revenues from the solar leases.
40
Feldman, David; and Settle, Edward (November, 2013). Master Limited Partnerships and Real Estate Investment
Trusts: Opportunities and Potential Complications for Renewable Energy. NREL Report. URL
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy14osti/60413.pdf
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most of this early US investment to date is for donor sponsorship and projects, 41 interest
in equity investments is ramping up in the US, and the concept has already seen much
more broad adoption overseas. It is important to note that Crowd Funding for equity
investment in the US, is currently largely constrained by SEC requirements to relatively
small amounts of funding - of under $1M dollars per year in a given investment .42 In
addition, there are already some US broker dealers operating in this space, even though
SEC requirements are not fully established; though many more are reportedly preparing
their applications for certification. With equity ownership and the associated profits, the
SEC will have a large say in how widely used and successful crowd funding will
ultimately be.43
o Another innovation that is gaining broader traction, is the more wide spread application
of Power Purchasing Agreements (PPAs). While PPAs have long been used by utilities,
the use of PPAs have moved beyond this traditional utility use in a number of ways that
may reshape utility relationships with the CE industry. For instance, large scale,
independent power producers such as NRG (which is both a competitor, and supplier to
larger utilities), have contributed to the growing use of CE technologies, often utilizing
PPAs.
PPAs (including closely related lease approaches) are also increasingly being used by a
variety of smaller CE power producer companies such as SolarCity and BloomEnergy,44
to help scale their residential and commercial businesses; PPAs are an attractive business
element model because of their ability to efficiently aggregate associated subsidies, to
make user payments more manageable, and to facilitate user access to the technology.
We should also note that the growing success in this area by companies like SolarCity in
expanding the commercialization of CE is also rapidly growing into contentious issue, as
it represents a threat to, and is being challenged increasingly by utilities. One challenge is
around net metering, and the associated allocation of transmission resources, including
the equitable distribution of costs and revenues across participants.45
o Another important addition to innovative financing comes from Jigr Shah46 who
pioneered the no money down approach to solar installations with SunEdison. Generate
41

SolarCity recently purchased privately held financial technology company Common Assets LLC to provide an
investment platform to distribute debt ala crowdfunding. See: Fehrenbacher, K . ( J A N . 1 5 , 2 0 1 4 ) . With startup
acquisition, SolarCity will open up solar investing to individuals. GIGAOM. URL
http://gigaom.com/2014/01/15/with-startup-acquisition-solarcity-will-open-up-solar-investing-to-individuals/
42
Koldony. L. (October 2013). “AngelList And Beyond: What VCs Really Think Of Crowdfunding.” Venture
Capital Dispatch. URL. http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2013/10/08/angellist-and-beyond-what-vcs-really-thinkof-crowdfunding/
43
SEC requirements, which are meant to prevent fraud and protect small investors, are not yet fully defined, though
many of them are available now for public comment. The requirements are expected to be finalized sometime in
2014.
44
While PPAs are mostly used for helping to fund downstream investments, Bloom Energy has been able to use a
form of PPA to complement and support their technology development needs by using their field experience and
maintenance programs to provide modifications along with corresponding verification of their technology.
45
Herndon, A (May 10, 2013). “Rooftop Solar Battle Pits Companies Against Utilities.” Bloomberg News. URL
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-10/rooftop-solar-battle-pits-companies-against-utilities.html
46
See: Fehrenbacher, Katie (Dec. 2014). “Meet Generated Capital, a new way to fund energy projects.” GIGACOM.
URL https://gigaom.com/2014/12/04/these-investors-are-using-the-solar-as-a-service-model-for-resources/
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Capital has a focus on “infrastructure as a service,” while not emphasizing PV
applications. Generate Capital offers multiple types of services, and products including
short term asset-based financing, and equipment leasing – in the $2M-20M (per project)
range for commercial scale renewable energy heating equipment, energy storage
projects, urban farms and water treatment technologies.
o

Some VCs are experimenting with aligning selected companies within their respective
portfolios, with specific targeted, large Bio-Pharma Companies in novel ways (somewhat
like what might be described as akin to anchor SIPs). According to GEN:47 “The newer
bio-pharma-venture partnerships are designed to offer something for everyone. Biopharma giants, get access to new technologies through startups that offer potential
licensing or acquisition opportunities. Start-ups get the expertise and capital of big
pharma, and potential for investment from other partners. And for venture firms, it’s
connection to the expertise from the life science partners as well as potential buyers or
licensors for the startups they back….” Time will tell, as we track the progress of the
model, and its numerous other emerging variations, some of which are summarized
briefly by GEN48), just how robust this process proves to be, and whether or not it can be
attractive in the CE environment.

o Family Offices are also quite interesting since they are potential source of large amounts
of capital. While the vast majority of Family offices are focused on wealth preservation,
they are also evolving as limited partners to PE firms including VCs, hedge funds, and
project financiers, and they have an advantage relative to many institutional investors
since - they are often less restricted in their investments and their time frame perspectives
can be longer term. While Family Office involvement in CE is still relatively modest,
interest is growing as indicated by the formation of the Clean Tech Syndicate (a group of
some 14 Family Offices with an interest in CE) that includes a number of firms such as
Prelude Ventures and Black Coral Capital that have been active in CE for a number of
years.
o Another area of financing showing rapid growth is in Green bonds, which may help
provide the $1 trillion annual investments in clean energy that environmental groups say
is necessary to limit the impact of climate change. In fact, more than $16.6 billion has
already been sold worldwide this year, surpassing last year’s $14 billion, as more
companies issue the debt to finance downstream clean energy projects according to
Bloomberg New Energy Finance.49 According to one expert cited in the Bloomberg
article noted that Green bonds offer a simple method for investors to tap into fixed
income markets and finance clean energy, including energy efficiency and sustainable
47 See: Philippidis, A. (May 24, 2012). “Recent Flurry of New Life Science Funds Aim to Start Bridging the Valley
of Death: It remains to be seen whether these partnerships will succeed in advancing more medicines.” Genetic
Engineering and Bio-Technology News (GEN). URL http://www.genengnews.com/insight-andintelligenceand153/recent-flurry-of-new-life-science-funds-aim-to-start-bridging-the-valley-of-death/77899612/.
Philippidis also gives several other examples of where major Bio-pharma firms have allied with a specific venture
fund.
48
Insight & Intelligence (June, 2013). “10 Industry-Venture Fund Alliances.” Genetics Engineering &
Biotechnology News - GEN. URL http://www.genengnews.com/keywordsandtools/print/3/31748/
49
Martin, Christopher (Jun 26, 2014). “Green Bonds Show Path to $Trillion Market.” Bloomberg Sustainability.
URL http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-26/green-bonds-show-path-to-1-trillion-market-for-climate.html
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business practices. The market for the bonds could top $40 billion this year and reach up
to $100 billion in 2015. Moreover, a coalition of banks, including Citi, Bank of America
Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), Credit Agricole SA (ACA) and others created a
common set of criteria for green bonds in January to act as a catalyst for the development
of the market. They have helped to create the asset class as well – important for
transitioning from upstream (helps upstream indirectly – provides assurance that there
will be funding downstream).

A Few Other Observations and Opportunities for
Building Partnerships
•

As a source of energy, there is growing recognition that Natural Gas (NG) the biggest
competitive threat to large scale CE commercialization in the near term. This threat also
points to the need for exploring opportunities for synergies between CE and NG
technologies. This has been done for electricity production, 50 and there are a number of
studies, looking at the impacts of Natural Gas (NG) including the likely related macro effects
on the US economy.51 However, the rapid growth and scope of investment in the and use of
NG, in particular shale gas and oil, by the other industries (including upstream NG
exploration and distribution), could well indicate that numerous additional synergies with CE
may be possible, along with corresponding partnerships.
For example, the energy intensive chemical industry, is gearing up to leverage the lower cost
of shale NG, for their own process energy needs, as well as for a source of feed-stock in the
production of lower cost commodities such as ammonia and fertilizer.52 The chemical
industry also anticipates that shale gas is will be a key element in the development and use of
new lower cost polymer based chemicals and materials for derived, engineered products. In
addition, there are fast growing subsectors such as that for natural gas liquids (NGL) from
shale gas production which the chemical and energy industries are increasingly exploiting for
ethylene production.53 Finally, the growing number of applications seems to be especially
important for the US chemical industry, particularly for manufacturing, and for export

50

See for instance: Lee, A.; Zinaman, O.; Logan J. ( December, 2012). Opportunities for Synergy Between Natural
Gas and Renewable Energy in the Electric Power and Transportation Sectors. NREL Report. URL
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/56324.pdf
51
Stanford Energy Modeling Forum (September 2013). Changing The Game?: Emissions And Market - Implications
Of New Natural Gas Supplies. EMF Report 26 Volume I. URL.
http://emf.stanford.edu/files/pubs/22532/Summary26.pdf
52
For example see: “PWC Corporate Report (Feb. 2013). “Shale Gas: Reshaping the US Chemicals Industry.” URL
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/industrial-products/publications/shale-gas-chemicals-industry-potential.jhtml
53
Morris, G. (Aug. 2014). Shale Gas, NGLs Fuel Large-Scale Petrochemical Investments. American Oil and Gas
Reporter. URL. http://www.aogr.com/web-features/exclusive-story/shale-gas-ngls-fuel-large-scale-petrochemicalinvestments

14

markets, 54 when one considers the growth and investment by the chemical industry in the US
gulf coast area.55
•

An encouraging CE example of how big industry can target, collaborate internationally (both
upstream and downstream) on R&D, and bring products to the marketplace when the time is
ripe is with Fuel cell powered automobiles. The decision to pursue fuel cell vehicle
development by numerous automakers at an accelerated rate is a fairly recent occurrence. For
instance, Toyota has announced plans to bring a new Fuel Cell vehicle to the market in 2015
- with numerous other offerings from Automakers; GM, Honda, Hyundai, Ford, Diamler,
Nissan,56 and BMW to enter the market place shortly there after. It is interesting to note,
while being quite relevant for technology commercialization in general, that this rapidly
growing interest and focus has resulted from hard won successes not only for the
development of fuel cells themselves, but also from concurrent achievements in storage
systems, electric drive systems and controls, and the initial steps in infrastructure
development.

•

Utilities will continue to play a major role in energy production and delivery, and they
control a major part of the nations energy infrastructure, especially that associated with
electricity, where they control several trillion dollars of assets. They should be considered as
potential partners, though generally not as a large source of direct equity investment for early
stage ventures having a focus on R&D, or especially for manufacturing technology
development and scale-up efforts.57 Though utilities have been users and sometimes owners
of CE technologies,58 their corporate financial structure and the constraints on investment
opportunities are considerably different from those of other large industries;59 this is true
whether the utility is investor owned or a municipal utility.
Moreover, the electric power utility industry is facing the specter of unprecedented global
transformation, driven to a large extent by an accelerating shift to distributed energy – and in
response, utility business models are going to have to change.60 Related to these anticipated
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Sider, A.(March 24, 2014). “Gas Boom Rejuvenates Manufacturing.” Wall Street Journal – Business Connect.
URL http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052702303802104579451723117384620
55
See for example: Boston, W. (Dec.17, 2013). “BASF Steps Up Investment in U.S.Economic Recovery, Shale-Oil
Boom Spur a Shift for the Chemical Giant.” WSJ. URL.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303949504579263903951305372
56
See the Diamler, Ford, Nissan Joint effort described at: Tschampa, D. (Jan 28, 2013). “ Daimler Adds Nissan as
Partner on Ford Fuel-Cell Project.” Bloomberg News. URL http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-28/daimlerplans-joint-fuel-cell-project-with-nissan-ford.html
57
There are of course exceptions to this. For instance E.ON, (along with Credit Suisse) made a $ 130Million later
stage technology investment in Bloom energy systems (see Appendix on the Bloom Energy Commercialization
Journey).
58
Projects using CE technologies, provide not only operating data on the associated CE technologies also breed
familiarity with the corresponding innovative energy technologies, and they can also help the participating utility
meet regional portfolio standard requirements, while taking advantages of tax and other credits available within their
regions.
59
For example, When regulated utilities provide debt and, or equity investment in CE technologies, such as for PV
and Wind, it is usually through an unregulated subsidiary (e.g. such as MidAmerican Renewables does within the
holding company, Mid American Energy).
60
To this point two German based Utilities are already undergoing significant re-focusing. For instance E.ON has
been broken into two units (one focused on renewables, and one for the rest of their traditional utility operations).
Further, Germany’s second largest utility, RWE says It Will Create a New ‘Prosumer Business Model’ that will help
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changes are a host of issues such as the fact that across much of the U.S. 61, demand for
electricity is flat or declining. Also, the industry's aging infrastructure needs to be beefed up
which will require a large amount of capital investment – while their revenues are stagnating
in many cases. Energy efficiency, falling solar prices, demand-side management, hybrid
Natural Gas / Solar systems, energy storage, and smart grid technology will all play a role in
this global transformation. All of this presages the need for new relationships between
utilities and the larger energy industry; including new potential partnerships with both the CE
industry, and the natural gas industry.62
•

Our white paper team has more recently become interested in the potential of long term
institutional investors (LTIs) to participate and even lead in the acceleration the
commercialization of attractive next generation CE technologies. LTIs that include pension
funds, sovereign wealth funds, and some very big family offices are the focus of a recent
study by Monk et al,63 which discusses the possibility that LTIs can serve as important
bridges for venture-backed, capital-intensive companies seeking commercial scale.
Moreover, the authors argue, that LTIs can potentially be more capital efficient, and overall
less costly, while concurrently reducing agency problems and integrating best in-class,
investor types to focus on the problem. Further, LTIs can participate in the success of these
companies over the long term. Moreover, the longer investment time frames (~10+years) and
larger investment size ($50-500MM) preferred by LTIs are in alignment with the anticipated
commercialization needs corresponding to large scale CE hardware innovations that require
complex material combinations and sophisticated manufacturing, and infrastructure
development as described above in this white paper.
Monk et al, also describe the creation and early operation of an alliance of LTI’s in a case
study, that put some of the above ideas to the test. The Alliance includes the New Zealand
Super Fund (NZSF64), the Alberta Investment Management Corporation (AIMCo) and the
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA). Right now the Alliance is operating based on
letters of intent, and has deployed about $700MM over the last few years in a number of
companies to help them achieve commercial scale by making sizeable commitments (e.g. in
the $50-100MM range). The Alliance pools resources to vet opportunities, while, for
example, engaging VCs from some of the worlds most prestigious firms to help de-risk

them position themselves as a project enabler and operator, and [as a] system integrator of renewables.
61
Journal Reports: Energy (April 8, 2014). “It's a Whole New Game.” WSJ News. URL.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230443260457947350068409481 . See also PWC ( April
2013). “13th PwC Annual Global Power & Utilities Survey.” URL. http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/utilities/globalpower-and-utilities-survey/
62
David Crane, CEO of NRG. Crane notes that, “The solar industry belongs with the natural gas industry -- those
industries go together. They just don’t know it yet.” See: LaMonica, M. ( November, 2013). NRG Energy Deploying
Dean Kamen’s Solar-Smart In-Home Generator. Greentech Media. URL.
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/NRG-Energy-Deploying-Dean-Kamens-Solar-Smart-In-HomeGenerator
63
See: Bachher, Jagdeep Singh and Clark, Gordon L. and Monk, Ashby H. B. and Sridhar, Kiran, ‘The Valley of
Opportunity’ Rethinking Venture Capital for Long-Term Institutional Investors (February 4, 2014). Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2391005. ‘The valley of Opportunity’ corresponds to the ‘gap’ discussed
extensively in this white paper.
64
For example, the New Zealand sovereign wealth fund (NZSF) has recently made, three investments (a mixture of
debt and equity) in three US based CE companies (Bloom, Ogin, and Lanza), representing some $165Million.
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portfolio companies’ business models.
•

Another recent development is the fact that Solar City is vertically integrating and going
beyond it core business as a service (i.e. installation maintenance, financing, and marketing)
company. For instance Solar City recently purchased Silveo, a PV manufacturing facility last
year (as noted above). The decision reflects SolarCity’s desire to control its equipment
supply and, in particular, the supply of low-cost solar panels that are efficient at producing
solar electricity, company.65 And they have a new ground breaking public-private partnership
with the state of New York,66 which is spending $750 million for building a 1.2 million
sq.ft. Facility and supporting infrastructure at Riverbend, NY, and the state is purchasing the
necessary equipment. Solarcity will lease the facility for ten years and over that period invest
$5 billion into running the facility that is expected to open early next year and create 3,000
direct and spin-off jobs. It is the first of what is expected to be multiple production facilities
around the United States.

65

See for example see: dailykos (June 17, 2014). “SolarCity's Chairman Elon Musk annouces it will buy solar panel
maker Silveo.” SciTech by Houndog. URL http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/06/17/1307693/-SolarCity-sChairman-Elon-Musk-annouces-it-will-buy-solar-panel-maker-Silveo.
66
See: http://buffalorising.com/2015/02/solarcitys-silveo-headquarters-is-staying-in-california/
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Appendix A – Inherent Challenges Within The Investment Gap
Consider first, the VC context in which VCs ideally target a 10 times (10X maybe more at
times) return in five to seven years, at which time they seek to exit their investment in the
innovative technology. Sufficient markets of at least $100M must also exist. Additionally, they
ideally want the technology in the marketplace (in beachhead markets at least) in two to three
years from the initial investment.
However, a good number of CE
Table A-1. Increased challenges to VC investments
technologies require 10 years (and
relative to those for software, and social Media
sometimes significantly more)67 from
often include one or more issues such as:
start-up, to significant revenues.
• Large capital expenses that require
Sometimes, even after two to three
o Development of new materials and material
rounds of VC investment, these
combinations.
entrepreneurial companies still are not
o The development, scale up, and verification of
far enough along in the
complex manufacturing processes (especially
commercialization process for their
for hardware).
current VCs and other early investors, to
• Longer times to market ( and to positive cash flow)
exit their investment and transition to,
with reduced ROI, sometimes resulting in greatly
reduced market size, and market share.
or access, PE/GrE financing. Also,
• Market uncertainties due to:
sometimes these ventures overshoot
o Public policy and Industry regulation, and
(almost all do it to some extent) the
political barriers.
original estimated time and cost
o Institutional barriers and a vast existing
milestones, due to the above noted
industry market infrastructure.
complexities. And the longer time
o Non Unique end market product (e.g. energy)
frames introduce additional risks as the
and competition (e.g. NG) from numerous
market may have changed in
other energy resources (large form factors as
unanticipated ways including the
well).
competitive, and volatile (and
• Complex / expensive, supply chain development
frequently changing) energy landscape.
and Integration (including those for market
And all of these can conspire to
channels and distribution networks)
significantly reduce the internal rate of
• Low market driven commodity price structure that
often drives returns
return (IRR) attained by the investors,
and their limited partners.68 Further,
return on the investment for energy
technologies are often limited by commodity pricing as the technology matures and is sold into
mainstream energy-related commodity like markets. These reasons are summarized in Table A-1
above.
And they relate directly to the investment Gap discussed above in the main body of the white
paper, between Venture Capital and Private Equity / Growth Equity. This investment gap is
different from the upstream cash flow valley of death,69 that is often discussed relative to very

67

These longer times and larger CAPEX investments (along with the 20/2 VC model) make it difficult for VCs to
deliver the needed return for themselves and for their limited partners.
68
For instance a 20% overshoot on time will typically reduce ROI by at least 20%
69
The cash flow valley of death referred to here occurs in the development, seed, and early portion of the start-up
stages. See: Murphy, L; Edwards, P. (May 2003). Bridging the Valley of Death: Transitioning from Public to
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early stage investments by angels and VCs. This gap, discussed in this white paper occurs in the
latter stage of the technology development portion of the commercialization process, where key
technology issues still exist and before the technology is in the market place; ie. with the
manufacturing process development, its scale up, and its verification – but it is before where
funding from private equity firms is usually applicable. Since the technology is not yet in the
market place, and key technology issues still exist,70 other forms of equity investment such as
from PE/GrE, are generally not available. At the same time VCs (and their limited partners) see
the venture as being to be too risky ( capital intensive, and possibly one that will require too long
a time to get to market as, discussed above) for them to continue investing – especially where
commodity like pricing for energy is likely to exist, also while many competitor in the energy
marketplace exist. Add in additional uncertainties in regulation (within a very complex
infrastructure for energy), and the resulting risk / reward for many equity investors doesn’t fit
their business model.
Quite simply put, most equity financiers don’t want to (and many can’t), pay for technology
development related to manufacturing and manufacturing technology scale-up of complex
hardware where new, and high performance materials are being used. This is true for Private
Equity firms (ala GrE), as well as VCs and their limited partners as discussed in this white paper.

Private Sector Financing. NREL/MP-720-34036. National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Golden, Colo. URL
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/gen/fy03/34036.pdf
70
Moreover, we should note that, we discuss the difficulties of both trying drive down cost / performance to
compete in commodity like markets, while keeping the keeping the investment costs under control; see Appendix B.
Obviously this issue impact the willingness of both VCs and their limited partners to invest in these technologies .
With respect to this conundrum, we also discuss how two innovative technologies (A123 and MiaSole) were fast
tracked for commercialization too early, and the ensuing bankruptcies resulted.

19

Appendix B - VCs Are Still Making Investments In CE
While many VCs (including some very high profile folks) have scaled back their investments in
clean energy, some have stopped all together – and as discussed above, some VCs have been
quite constrained in their ability to raise additional funds from limited partners; especially
institutional partners. Other reasons (beyond those discussed above), and perspectives that VCs
give as to why their interest in making CE investments vary. For instance, some insist that they
currently “are doing just fine,” and others who are pulling back say that “it’s not for lack of
money, its that there are not enough really good ideas.” Moreover, some have noted that “its just
that CE is not a hot area anymore.” That said, there are number of areas where VC’s continue to
fund the commercialization of CE technologies, which include, but are not limited to those
ventures that:71
• Address issues like energy efficiency for commercial businesses, and industrial processes,72
and/or that help to address regulatory issues – such as issues that are likely to remain stable
or increasingly more favorable to investment over time (e.g. Smart Grid).
• Are based on technology combinations that leverage software, and / or, leverage existing IT73
in novel ways with CE, and where they can access customers, markets, and partners quickly
and at relatively low cost (e.g. through the web),74 such as with Nest and Opower.
• Fit well within the current industry potential partners, products and associated customer
bases; including where obtaining a license for the new technology is possible (e.g. the
partnership between Total and SunPower discussed above)
• Can leverage and be plugged into existing business infrastructure and operations within a
given industry (e.g. the recent purchase of Albeo by GE for their commercial and residential
lighting businesses)75
• Focus on developing innovative, key sub-components and systems such as PV inverters,
novel wind turbine drives, and innovative PV racking systems for field installation, as well as
building integrated control systems for PV and lighting installations
• Are entrepreneurial companies such as SolarCity, and Sunjevity that are deploying well
vetted key technologies (solar cells) from any of a number of vendors in their products –
while not a technology development company, Solar City for example is primarily a scaleable PV installation, financing, marketing, and service company

71

It should be noted that the in most of examples given below most have virtually no (or little) technology risk, or
perceived manufacturing technology development or manufacturing scale-up issues, and most frequently they have
relatively low CAPEX requirements. Moreover the times to market, and total VC investment is fairly constrained,
while the path to market is clear for each respective example.
72
For example, process related energy efficiency improvements are often quite attractive to industry participants
since the results can frequently and visibly accrue to bottom line profitability.
73
IT that does not require major expensive innovations and infrastructure development such as for meters, sensors
and wireless communication.
74
For example Shah estimated that, “20 percent plus of all energy can be offset with ICT (Internet Communications
Technologies).” See: Jigar Shah (July 11, 2012). “Why Diluted Investments Are Diluting Cleantech’s Impact.”
GIGAOM.
75
See: Chernova, Y. (NOVEMBER 26, 2012). Braemar Nails Positive Exit by Selling LED Co. Albeo to GE. Dow
Jones VentureWire. URL http://www.braemarenergy.com/news/media/2012/albeo_venturewire_1126.html. Braemar
Energy Ventures saw a quick return on its $6.5 million investment in light-emitting-diode company Albeo
Technologies Inc., which is being sold to General Electric Co.
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•

•

Offer new high value enabling capabilities applicable to a number of existing industries such
as Ambri which provides large scale energy storage in the form of novel liquid metal,76 flow
and other batteries or thermal media.
Can leverage DOD national security needs (as well as shared development cost) such as the
US Navy’s move towards getting half of its fleet fuel from biofuels by 2020. In this case the
DOD is providing a market for cost effective biofuels, and is willing to buy down the risk,
associated with the research development of the corresponding innovations.77

76

Martin,C. (Mar 6, 2014). “MIT’s Liquid Metal Stores Solar Power Until After Sundown.” Bloomberg New Energy
Finance. URL http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-06/mit-s-liquid-metal-stores-solar-power-until-aftersundown.html
77
Biofuels is an example of a technology for which manufacturing of large hardware does not appear to be a current
problem – though process scale up has been an issue in the past. Further, there has been a resurgence in VC/LP
investment in the space over the last two years (e.g. by Shell Ventures, Khosla and others), helped no doubt by the
US Navy’s push to get 50% of its fuel from renewable resources, as well as by the ability of a number of companies
to build expanded platforms across a range of applications and products (e.g. chemicals) in the international arena.
Industry examples include both big companies such as Dupont, and small start-ups like Lanza industry.
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Appendix C – Balancing Technology Cost / Performance and
Investment Challenges in The Gap
The Technology Cost / Performance and Investment Challenges along with the issue of large
CAPEX, and longer times to market, deserves more discussion, as do the inherent causes. It
should also be noted that these issues lead to much higher risk, and the company may be stalled
(and run out of money) in its commercialization efforts if these challenges are not adequately
addressed.78 This is because, for instance many new energy technologies face increasingly more
challenging difficulties including rapidly growing resource needs at times, depending on their
stage of development, especially as they relate to manufacturing scale-up; there can be a good
deal of technical risk in the manufacturing and scale up process itself – and sometimes this is
where technology innovation is most needed.79
For instance, this problem can be especially thorny for technologies that require new material
sets as well as the development of sophisticated, novel manufacturing processes. Moreover, if for
instance, the manufacturing process is scaled up in size quite effectively, but does not reach the
desired cost and performance levels, the resulting size of the original anticipated markets can be
greatly reduced — and the justification for the large investment needed is made much more
difficult (not withstanding the other market uncertainties discussed in the above main body of the
white paper). Quite simply most investors, including most VCs, are often not willing to take on
these technical risks in the manufacturing scale up process even if initially anticipated cost /
performance and market targets are seen as robust, especially where the needed investment is
growing rapidly, and the performance / cost levels are increasingly chasing very low and often
volatile commodity like prices.
For example, consider that a new technology (e.g. Battery, thin film PV, or fuel cell) technology
can often be shown to be feasible in the lab, and at the lab scale prototype, at a relatively small
cost and short time frame. However, getting to a small pilot prototype scale can easily require a
factor of ten more investment, and much more time to get there as well. By far, however, and this
is where the VC-limited partner model has difficulty. The biggest challenge is to show that the
technology can be scaled, and demonstrated at a given cost and level of performance in a robust
manufacturing environment – some times the cost of doing this can be 100 (or more) than the
costs requirements for getting to the smaller scale pilot prototype. This very large investment
need often is where small companies, that have not shown their technology to be market feasible,
at cost and performance (as well have a clear path to revenue and positive cash flow), get into
trouble, and can run out of money as noted above.
The conundrum of satisfying both technology cost / performance and investment requirements
discussed above is illustrated schematically in the Figure C-1 as a function of technology
78

Moreover, these manufacturing and scale up technology improvements and innovations, are needed continually to
get to ever lower cost performance and larger market share. This is especially important when commodity markets
are pursued and approached.
79
For example, by rough analogy, consider the scale up and in size of semiconductor wafers over the last 25+ years.
Each size jump in wafer size has required numerous years and many 10s of millions of investment dollars, even
though the basic processes and much of the basic chemistry have been understood for many years. And SEMATEC,
and the numerous member industry partners still keeps at it – to keep the US in the forefront of this industry.

22

Cost%/%Performance%

Required%Investment%

development time; this figure illustrates that while cost / performance decreases, at a lessening
rate with time through further technology development, the required investment (and the
attendant risk) can simultaneously rise at (and sometimes at a quite high) rate over the same time
Technology
Performance and
Investment vs Time
period.80 Also note, regarding this schematic figure, that
several Cost
key/ technology
development
milestones are shown including: 1.) basic
technology feasibility; 2.) lab scale prototypes
of key elements; 3.) pilot level - prototype
Key$Milestones$
products; 4. ) manufacturing scale-up, and
1
performance /reliability demo. and; 5.) first
commercial plant(s). While many clean energy
2
technologies can be brought to stage 3, in 5-7
years, reaching stage 4 or 5 may take double the
time or more; with much more attendant cost
3
4
and market risk.
5

Further, the risk associated with reaching stages
1
3
5
7
9
11
Technology%Development%Time%,%Yrs%
4 and 5 can grow nearly exponentially with the
required investment because of a number of
Figure C-1. Technology Cost/Performance and
factors beyond technical uncertainties with
Investment vs Time
manufacturing scale-up. These include risk
uncertainties from market volatility, and emerging competition over the intervening, and
extended time frame. In addition this schematic shows different levels of cost / performance
requirements corresponding to different levels of market penetration as dashed lines.81
Moreover, it should be noted that these later, larger investments (e.g. for stages 4 and 5),
frequently require primarily private sector financing, while earlier investments (e.g. for stages 1 3) can often be financed with a combination of both public sector and private sector resources.
Further, these earlier stages, through stage 3, often represents the sweet spot for VCs; and at
these lower levels it is often easier to syndicate the deal.
For example, consider what occurred with the battery maker A12382, 83 to better illustrate the
above discussion.
•

The novel lithium battery technology had been vetted quite successfully, at a small scale, and
prototype elements for a larger battery system had been manufactured successfully with the
desired, initially acceptable performance.

80

It is important to note that as long as cost / performance levels denoted by numbers 4 and 5 in the figure are being
pursued, there are often still technology uncertainties that go significantly beyond the normal manufacturing
learning processes.
81
The top dashed curve might correspond to a key enabling technology where the cost is not be a significant driver.
The bottom dashed curve would correspond to a case where the technology must compete on cost in commodity like
markets.
82
William J. Holstein. (October 17, 2012). What the A123 Bankruptcy Means. October 17, 2012. URL
http://williamjholstein.com/blogs/what-a123-bankruptcy-means . Holstein is also the author of The Next American
Economy
83
Kessen, J. ( Mar 29, 2013). “Confusion on our Company Name - It's Still A123.” The Pulse - A123 blog. URL.
http://info.a123systems.com/blog/bid/175891/Confusion-on-our-Company-Name-It-s-Still-A123
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•

However, the systems level technology did not advance as quickly as hoped for (this includes
both the energy storage capacity to improve auto range, and reliability at the hoped for cost
and performance; they built out their manufacturing too fast, and the hoped for improvement
in system performance did not result. The resulting reliability led to a recall and lost potential
profitability. They needed more time to drive down costs, and increase performance of the
battery subsystem. Basically, “learning as you go” was not occurring apace with the build out
of manufacturing.84

•

The markets (for electric car batteries) did not materialized in the hoped for time frame,
further complicating the economic viability of this technology in the near term…..as well as
its chances for attracting continued investment.

•

As a result A123 filed for bankruptcy, and restructuring. Johnson Controls, who also
produces lithium-ion batteries for Ford (based on licensing from a French firm) made a bid
(which was initially approved) to acquire it, but was out bid by Chinese auto parts supplier
Wanxiang Group. Both of these groups have the staying power to continue bringing the
company forward – but for many of the original investors much was lost. A123 systems is
now focused on Hybrids, and is still operating its plants in the U.S. thus preserving a good
number of jobs (about 70% of the level prior to the bankruptcy) while having access to deep
pockets from the Wanxiang Group, until demand picks us; A123 is also continuing the
building of infrastructure.85

In another example, illustrating the above conundrum, the thin film PV company Mia Sole
(trying to compete with First Solar Inc. (FSLR), the biggest maker of thin-film panels by
shipments) was in the midst of dealing with this manufacturing technology and investment
conundrum, when they ran out of money - the firm couldn’t, and wasn’t likely to make money in
the foreseeable future in the face of cheaper imported panels from China. And MiaSole was sold,
at level estimated to be about $30M to a Chinese firm (Hanergy) even though they raised
upwards of $500 million from Kleiner Perkins and others and was once valued at $1.2 billion.86

84

Bullis, K. (October 18, 2012). “A123's Technology Just Wasn't Good Enough.” MIT Technology Review – Energy
News. URL http://www.technologyreview.com/news/429647/a123s-technology-just-wasnt-good-enough/
85
Ramsey, M. (Oct. 8, 2013). “Battery Maker Shifts to Hybrid Car Focus: Revived A123 Systems Sees Future in
Advances for Gasoline-Powered Cars.” Wall Street Journal News. URL.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304441404579123603727420142
86
Guglielmo, C; Geron, T. (May 27, 2013). “John Doerr's Plan To Reclaim The Venture Capital Throne.”
Forbes.Com. URL http://www.forbes.com/sites/connieguglielmo/2013/05/07/john-doerrs-plan-to-reclaim-theventure-capital-throne/
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Appendix D – More Thoughts on Meeting SIP Needs
Beyond the discussion of meeting SIP needs and concerns given in the body of the white paper
there are numerous other important related considerations when partnerships are being pursued
with SIPs. For instance, there may be a wide variation on the kind of partnership that specific
SIPs are seeking – they may be looking for a single, or multiple partners, an ultimate merger, or
other arrangement. Also for example, SIPs will want, and / or need to:
•

Protect their proprietary, corporate strategic other related information. However, this need “to
protect” can sometimes be at odds with the ability to fully understand and adequately address
specific SIP business needs effectively while leveraging SIP core capabilities and strengths.87

•

Know how a specific a particular partnership will likely affect key SIP business indicators;
e.g. market size, stock price, etc.88 SIPs want to see as much detail as possible as to just how
their own companies profit from and can monetize their investment by developing and
bringing CE technology products to market. And if applicable SIPs want to know how the
new technology will impact their current business line and product portfolio.

•

Access and deploy increasingly more robust due diligence, with robust data and other related
information that supports better decision making, including the ability to understand and
address a number of key issues related to developing markets and dealing with policy. In
particular SIPs want:
o Access to the best current, and well vetted, information on key technology issues related
to the deployment and profitability of CE technologies. For example the real need for
storage vis-s-vis dispatch-ability with renewables is not uniformly understood or agreed
upon; e.g. with electricity generation frequently, according to recent information, more
than 30% penetration may be possible without storage – while others believe only 15% or
lower is realistically achievable.
o More robust information to help them make better decisions on when (now or ten years
from now?) and how to enter certain markets within various policy environments, and
definition on the implications for their businesses and markets over the long term. This is
important to support market development in the global environment.
o Preferably get involved early in the technology development process so as to have the
best opportunity to impact the commercialization trajectory, yet innovators may not know
how to help them best incorporate new technologies into their business lines, or help in
other ways if SIP needs are not understood (some times SIPs simply may not want this
kind of help).

87

However, this need “to protect” can sometimes be at odds with the ability of potential partners to fully understand
and adequately address specific SIP business needs, perspectives and assumptions effectively. This extends to
having insight on new products and technologies that may be in the respective SIP product and strategy pipelines. In
addition, different SIPs may also have good sized strategic analysis staffs performing evaluations that are not readily
available.
88
Such information will help then make the argument to investment to the SIP stockholders, and boards of directors.
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Appendix E – Is the VC- Limited Partner Investment Model Broken?
A recent Kaufman Foundation report (by Mulcahy etal, May 2012)89 showed that there clearly is
a problem with the limited partner model based on their experience. For instance, the Kauffman
Foundation investment team, study analyzed their twenty-year history of venture investing
experience in nearly 100 VC funds with some of the most notable and exclusive partnership
the past few years, butmodel
still has a way
go to return to pre-1995
levels.8 If  it’s  true  
“brands” and concluded that “the Limited Partner (LP)overinvestment
istobroken.
Limited
that too much capital is dragging down returns, money should be flowing out of VC until
Partners—foundations, endowments, and state pensionreturns
fund—invest
too much capital in
normalize. Despite more than a decade of poor returns relative to publicly traded
underperforming venture capital funds on frequently misaligned
example
stocks, however, thereterms.”
appears to be For
only a modest
retrenchmentand
by LPs.more
We wonder:
specifically, a study of their own portfolio noted that: why are LPs so committed to investing in VC despite its persistent underperformance?
LP hopes for VC returns are high, and those hopes fuel new money into VC funds

•

“Only twenty of 100 venture funds generated returns
thatA Probitas
beatPartners
a public-market
equivalent
nationwide.
survey of nearly 300 institutional
investors foundby
that
two-thirdsinvesting
of investors expectprior
a 2x+ multiple
from top quartile, early-stage VC funds.9
more than 3 percent annually, and half of those began
to 1995.

•

twelve-year
period from 1997
to 2009, thereavailable
have been only five
vintage years
The majority of funds—sixty-two out of 100—failed
to exceed
returns
from
thein which
median VC funds generated IRRs that returned investor capital, let alone doubled it. It’s  
public markets, after fees and carry were paid.
notable that these poor returns have persisted through several market cycles: the

Contrary to those lofty expectations, Cambridge Associates data show that during the

•

Internet boom and bust, the recovery, and the financial crisis. The chart below shows

“The
Average
Fund
Barely
that, in eight ofcapital
the
past twelve
years,
the typical
VC fund Returns
generated
a negative
Only four of thirty venture capital funds with committed
ofvintage
more
than
$400
million
IRR, and for the other four years, barely eked out a positive return.
delivered returns better than those available from a publicly traded
small
cap
common
stock
Investor Capital After Fees”
index.
The averageFrom
VC fund
barely returns investor capital after fees
Mulcahy – Kaufman Foundatiuon
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vintage years, the typical VC fund generated a negative IRR, and for the other four years, barely
eked out a positive return.”
While the report has been controversial for some, others characterized the report was
“groundbreaking” most agree that the Kaufman report, despite its possible short -comings, has
been quite valuable in bringing this to the subject to the fore. For instance, in a recent discussion
with Google Ventures’ managing partner Bill Maris90 noted that "The past 10 years haven't been
very productive," Maris also points out that according to the research firm Cambridge
Associates, during the decade ending last September, VCs as a class earned a 2.6% interest rate
for their investors--less than you could have earned in an S&P 500 index fund.91 The numbers
look slightly better over shorter periods; VCs have delivered a 4.9% return the past three years
and 6.7% over the past five, still far from terrific.” In another commentary Andy Rachleff,
current President and CEO of Wealthfront, and co-founder and former general partner of
Benchmark Capital, recently noted that according to Cambridge Associates, an advisor to
institutions that invest in venture capital,” that only about 20 firms – or about 3 percent of the
universe of venture capital firms – generate 95 percent of the industry’s returns, and the
composition of the top 3 percent doesn’t change very much over time.”92
Also, some have a somewhat divergent view on various points of the discussion. For example,
see Scott Anthony, managing partner of Innosight, and prolific author on the subject of
innovation, also comments on the implications of the Kaufman study,93 in particular, those
aspects of the report related to statistics and the need for better ways of teasing out explanations
for causality, and not just correlation; though Mulcahy starts to do that with her team’s
discussion on biases. To this point Anthony briefly discussed the Google model (see above)
which puts more science behind their correlations and success indicators than does the VC
industry in general. Further, Anthony, noted that competition, where the number of VC firms has
exploded over the last decade, along with decreasing barriers to entry and the growing number of
disruptive entrants, as one possible (and almost inevitable) reason for some of the reduction in
VC returns.
The Kaufman fund is not ignoring venture investments – though they are taking a more rigorous
approach to finding and vetting deals along with a broader portfolio approach, as well as more
partnering with moderately sized VC firms that have a long and well established history of top
tier performance.
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Appendix F - Access To Downstream Private Growth Equity From
Dedicated Private Equity Firms
In comparison to Venture Capital (VC), Private Equity (PE)94 firms make investments that are
typically quite a bit larger and with a longer timeframes for life of their investments. Hence PE
firms are an important part of the financial food chain.95 PE firms, when taken in total, have
access to much more capital than do VCs. PE firms largely focus on LBOs, and Growth Equity
(GrE) investments; GrE is the most relevant form for this discussion. GrE is most often a
minority investment, in later stage, relatively mature entrepreneurial ventures that are looking for
capital to expand or restructure their own operations, execute on secured contracts, enter new
markets, or finance a significant acquisition. Beyond equity, GrE firms often can provide a
portion of debt that can fund working capital or potential minor technology improvements or
enhancements mainly focused on product development. Besides access to funds, PE/GrE firms
also have quite extensive market development, product strategy and business growth expertise as
well as access to investment banking services and preparation for IPOs or M&As events as
needed to help accelerate the growth of the business.
However, often many clean energy ventures with innovations do not qualify for private equity
(PE).96 Even those PE firms that specialize in providing Growth Equity (GrE) to growing
companies, preclude support for virtually all technology driven, scale-up development. This is
due to some fairly restrictive requirements based on perceived technology risks, time to liquidity,
and, quite importantly, the general maturity of the venture. More specifically, GrE firms don’t
take and any significant technology risks (especially with the key technology components).97
Also, to qualify for GrE funding, the technology based venture typically must have products /
services in the marketplace, and in many cases (i.e. especially for LBOs) must have robust cash
flow.98 Further, PE firms that provides GrE funding will most likely as noted above requires at
least partial control of the company with the potential to significantly change the direction of the
company.
Hence GrE resources, which are most appropriate for downstream investments, are not
applicable for the costly and time consuming technology development corresponding to
manufacturing scale up as discussed in this white paper, nor in any situations where there are
94

Dedicated private equity firms are groups of investors, that use collected pools of capital from wealthy
individuals, pension funds, insurance companies, endowments, etc. to invest in businesses. The main difference
between venture capital and growth equity investors is their risk profile and investment strategy; e.g. PE firms more
frequently use combinations of equity and debt to make their investments and the investment levels are usually quite
large relative to VC investments. Hence PE firms make fewer, but larger (sometimes in the hundreds of millions of
dollars) and longer term investments.
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For example, Silver Lake Kraftwerk focuses on providing growth capital to technology innovators (e.g. SolarCity)
with established business models in the energy and resource sectors.
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See Herndon, A.; Martin, C. (Jan 15, 2013). “Private Equity Flees Clean Energy as Investment Falls.” Bloomberg
News. URL.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-15/private-equity-flees-clean-energy-as-investment-falls-energy.html
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Hence, while GrE is an important element of the commercialization food chain it does not address the expensive
upstream technology development issues such as those related to scale up of manufacturing for which is discussed
extensively above.
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If all these hurdles are overcome, then the venture may be an acquisition candidate, such as Abeo was, by GE
Lighting. See: Chernova, Y. (Nov. 26, 2012). “Braemar Nails Positive Exit by Selling LED Co. Albeo to GE.” Dow
Jones VentureWire. URL http://www.braemarenergy.com/news/media/2012/albeo_venturewire_1126.html/
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significant technology risks; for example they are not appropriate for, for first-of-a-kind
demonstration plants. projects. To this point J. Shah,99 notes that there are several hundred such
innovative technology projects that, even though they have met all of their technology
milestones, fall into this category.
We should also note that most individual entrepreneurial companies generally cannot secure
funding directly from the limited partners that supply funding for many of the PE/GrE (as well as
VC) firms – since these institutional investors (e.g. pension funds, endowments, etc.) most often
don’t want (and / or have the appropriate resources) to manage the growth and start-up
operations of individual companies. Hence the limited partners invest with VC or PE funds, to
manage their investments.
Not everything is bad news about trying to access Private Equity financing, and making the
transition from VC funding. Beyond dedicated private equity firms, large vertically integrated
capital firms have shown a growing interest in, and can in some cases provide an easier transition
to GrE.100 For example VantagePoint Capital Partners (VPCP) – previously named VantagePoint
Venture Partners – has a large energy related practice, and has developed a focus on “growth
equity”, that “goes beyond where venture goes.”101 Large integrated investment capital firms like
Kleiner Perkins, and Vantage Point often have robust, experience based, track records working
with, a wide spectrum of external advisors, and world-class strategic partners. And they can
provide guidance on, and connections to a wide range of other financial services (e.g. investment
banking, project financing), human capital, legal, marketing, science, and portfolio management,
thus help to further reduce the perceived risk for future investment. Thus, if an entrepreneurial
venture is a good fit within one of the large integrated capital firms, then the process of obtaining
GrE funding and a host of other support services, may be facilitated greatly as the entrepreneurial
company and its technology matures along its commercialization path.
Finally, while recognizing the importance of GrE the National Venture Capital Association
(NVCA)102 recently announced the formation of the NVCA Growth Equity Group,103 “that is
tasked to help specialized growth equity investors support companies, which are growth engines
for the economy,” by focusing on “this final part of the venture investment life cycle.” Moreover,
there are a number of other options for PE/GrE that are starting to emerge from foreign firms,
99

In fact there are a good, and growing number of existing companies that have received venture and other early
stage financing, but that are stuck in the resource gap as described above. For example see: Shah, J. (July, 2012).
“Why diluted investments are diluting cleantech’s impact.” URL http://gigaom.com/2012/07/11/why-dilutedinvestments-are-diluting-cleantechs-impact/
100
But not, as discussed above for the expensive upstream technology development issues such as those related to
scale up of manufacturing for key technology components.
101
See Appendix E2 which discusses the broad base of partners working with Bright Source, one of VPCP’s
portfolio companies. Similarly, Appendix E1 discusses the commercialization journey of Bloom Energy which is a
portfolio company of Kleiner Perkins Caufield and Byers (KPBC).
102
See: National Venture Capital Association (Jan 28, 2013). “NVCA Recognizes Growth Equity As Critical Part
Of Venture Capital Landscape: Newly Formed Member Sub-Group Focuses On The Capital Needs Of Later-Stage,
Emerging Growth Companies.” NVCA. URL
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=935&Itemid=93
103
Mentioned as board members of the NVCA Growth Equity Group, are representatives from Summit Partners,
Element Partners, Silver Lake Kraftwerk, and growth equity industry liaisons from Catalyst Investors, and
Technology Crossover Ventures.
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including some investor owned utilities (e.g. E.ON which is discussed briefly in an Appendix),
but they can be difficult to identify, navigate and secure funding.
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Appendix G – The Bloom Energy, Commercialization Journey
A successful Bloom energy could be a testament to the viability of capital-intensive, VC-funded
cleaner energy breakthroughs and the virtue of distributed power generation.104,105,106
Underlining the potential for Bloom’s success, Scott Sandell, a partner at NEA and a Bloom
board member, was quoted recently by Reuters as saying that Bloom will likely attempt an IPO
late this year or early next.107 Also, there are reported hints that this this could be the year for its
first quarterly profits. The valuation of the company has recently been estimated to be nearly
$3.0B.
Success has not come easy. Bloom fuel cell technology has had many commercialization
challenges similar to the other technologies described in this white paper; and some of these
challenges are still being experienced. These challenges (which considered in total, can deter or
even preclude many VCs to become engaged in similar investments) include a the combination
of complex technology, new material materials and configurations, a need to demonstrate
manufacturing scale-up of critical of key components (e.g. electrodes, electrolytes and
catalysts)…..Bloom has also needed to address long investment horizons, and very large
investment requirements, all while simultaneously needing build market channels and
distribution networks. Moreover the fuel cell industry for commercial scale power, is both highly
competitive and littered with many money loosing (to date) ventures.
The concept: Bloom, previously known as Ion America until 2006, was founded in 2002 K.R.
Sridhar. Bloom builds solid oxide fuel cells. The fuel can come from a variety of inputs
(including liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons produced from bio sources) to generate electricity on
the site where it will be used; natural gas as fuel is most common in the states. Bloom Energy
fuel cell systems may be up to twice as efficient as a gas-fired power station; some twenty
percent of the Bloom Energy Server cost savings depend upon avoiding transfer losses that result
from energy grid use.
The company has seen increasing demand for its electricity-led Energy Server fuel cells in the
last four years, first in California and now across the USA. The technology platform can serve
many needs but is particularly focused on distributed power needs, as well as premium and high
reliability applications (e.g. server farms, and telecommunication power requirements). One
significant technical achievement is that Bloom Energy's system doesn't use expensive materials,
notably platinum, which is used as a catalyst in many types of fuel cells. While Bloom Energy
won’t say exactly what it uses, it does say that their fuel cells use a ceramic made from sand as
the electrolyte and special inks for the electrodes - researchers have long been trying to make
fuel cells without platinum.
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URL http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=next-generation-flex-fuel-cells-ready
105
Fehrenbacher, K. (May13, 2013). “Report: Bloom Energy raises another $130M.” GIGAOM. URL
http://gigaom.com/2013/05/13/report-bloom-energy-raises-another-130m/
106
Martin LaMonica, M. (March 1, 2010). Parsing fact from fiction with the Bloom Energy box. CNET NEWS. URL
http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-10461359-54.html
107
Wesoff, E. (JUNE 12, 2013). Greentech Media. URL http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/E.ONWorlds-Largest-Investor-Owned-Utility-Invests-100M-in-Bloom-Energy

31

Raising Money. Bloom has been constantly been raising investment. For example Bloom
Energy has received $400 million of start-up funding from venture capitalists, including Kleiner
Perkins and Vinod Khosla. Over the last decade years Bloom raised more than $1.2 billion in
venture capital from investors including GSV Capital, Apex Venture Partners, DAG Ventures,
Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, Mobius Venture Capital, Madrone Capital, New Enterprise
Associates, SunBridge Partners, and Goldman Sachs. Beyond just financing, of course, Bloom
has an all-star and well-connected board that provide insights and is able to open many doors.
More recently (May, 2013) Bloom raised about $100M from the German based utility, E.ON.,
which is the world’s largest investor owned utility; Credit Suisse added another ~$30M to the
round. What makes this investment quite interesting is that this investment is a significant
endorsement by one of the world's largest utilities of the distributed generation model (where
Bloom has a focus), and also because E.ON., unlike most US based utilities, makes technology
development based investments. Also E.ON. has ongoing relationship with micro combined heat
and power fuel cell manufacturer Ceramic Fuel Cells and its flagship wind-to-hydrogen plant,
currently under construction in Falkenhagen, Germany, which uses Hydrogenic electrolysers to
demonstrate the power-to-gas concept.108 The investment in Bloom makes sense for the company
(according to one analyst), which is trying to reduce its carbon intensity. Another interesting
twist is that such a substantial investment by E.ON. may mean that the door to Europe is now
open for Bloom; though (as of this writing) Bloom has not installed units in Europe to date.109
Regarding other funding, Bloom Energy has not received any Department of Energy grants
directly. However, in October 2012, the US government awarded Bloom Energy $70,710,959
under its section 1603 energy awards program. Moreover, Bloom, through its market and sales
program, has often been quite successful in leveraging PPA opportunities for getting rate payer
subsidies in states like CA (predominantly) and Delaware. Thus, initial customer demos have
been often subsidized – by local regions.
Bloom’s business model, exploits multiple applications which builds on its flexible fuel cell
platform. Bloom’s business model also exploits for instance, opportunities to create beachhead
markets with high margins such as applications for which fuel cells such as premium power for
the military, remote sites, construction industry, travel, and sites needed very high reliability and
clean power. In other markets for cost competitive, non-premium power, Bloom Fuel cells must
be paired with state incentives such as those from California which Bloom has done.
The Bloom flexible-fueling (natural gas and hydrogen) advantage has enabled Bloom to sell
some 120 natural gas–fuel SOFCs, stand-alone heat and power units that produce both electricity
and heat for a local site, to green-minded Fortune 500 corporate plants and state university
facilities—notably, subsidized distributed power demonstration projects in California. The
company is even building a new plant in Delaware and will sell 30 megawatts of its Bloom Box
fuel-cell units to the local utility, Delmarva Power. Bloom’s lower cost leasing program appears
to be one key to their success.
108

Several groups in Germany are looking at fuels cells that would replace the whole power generation block with a
fuel cell system using a combination of hydrogen (that would be produced by electrolysis using regional excess
wind power), and natural gas for fuel.
109
We should also mention that Bloom has also recently received two investments, totaling some $200MM, from
the New Zealand Super Fund.
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Bloom Energy has a service to allow customers to buy the electricity generated by its fuel cells
without incurring the capital costs of purchasing the six-figure devices.... Under the Bloom
Electrons service, customers sign 10-year contracts to purchase the electricity generated by
Bloom Energy Servers while the company retains ownership of the fuel cells and responsibility
for their maintenance.
Moreover, these Power Purchase Agreements allow Bloom Energy to have a high touch
approach to address and improve maintenance, as well as evaluate and upgrade reliability, as
well as cost / performance of key components, using a learn as you go approach, all while not
engendering concern by the customer. Bloom Energy argues that the service can help customers
save up to 20 percent on their bills. What’s also notable is that the Electrons service could give
Bloom Energy steady, predictable recurring revenue that can be used for expansion.
Bloom has been developing a strong customer base as well as market channels and distribution
networks, for a long time now. For instance those more than 120 application 120 natural gas–fuel
SOFCs, stand-alone heat and power units that produce both electricity and heat for a local site,
are intended for commercial and industrial applications, and the firm boasts an all-star list of
customers, including Adobe, Apple, FedEx, Staples, Google, Coca-Cola, and Wal-Mart. and
eBay, as well as US communications network AT&T, Bank of America, and Safeway.
Bloom Energy argues that the service can help customers save up to 20 percent on their bills.
What’s also notable is that the Electrons service could give Bloom Energy steady, predictable
recurring revenue that can be used for expansion.
While Bloom began installation in commercial buildings or large retail outlets, they have one
large installation under way to provide power to a utility directly. One reason they own the
facilities is the tax incentives but the other might be the technology has not been around long
enough for consumers to buy and own the boxes so Bloom is forced to own and maintain them.
Bloom also built a manufacturing plant in I believe Maryland (Delaware??) recently to take
advantage of tax incentives from the state.
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Appendix H: Crowdfunding - Requirements For Equity Investments
Are Still Evolving
In the body of this White Paper we discussed ongoing Crowdfunding activity, and the potential
for equity investments using web based Crowdfunding platforms. In this Appendix we provide
some highlights from a recent Hamilton Clark Research Report,110 which emphasize that while
there is rapidly growing interest, this mechanism for financing is not yet fully developed, as SEC
investment requirements have not been finalized - though comments on initial requirements put
forth by the SEC are currently being reviewed and the resulting requirements should be finalized
sometime in early 2014. Following, are a few highlights, based on this Research Report, that
should be considered by those seeking funding using this mechanism.
Purpose of the Hamilton Clark Research Report. There is a lot of confusion in the financing
market about recent changes brought about by the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the
“JOBS Act”) in the way that companies can use the private placement exemption to finance their
companies in the venture capital and private equity markets. This research report addresses the
difference between traditional Rule 506(b) offerings that do not permit “general solicitation”,
new Rule 506(c) offerings that permit general solicitation, and crowdfunding transactions.
Rule 506 Private Placements – Background. In 2012 the JOBS Act was enacted to reduce
barriers to capital formation, particularly for small businesses. Among other provisions, the
JOBS Act required the SEC to create new exemptions for small businesses to raise capital
without SEC registration under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”). In July 2013
the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 506 of Regulation D and Rule 144A of the Securities Act
to implement the requirements of Title II (Section 201(a)) of the JOBS Act.
These amendments were effective in September 2013, and in November 2013 the SEC’s
Division of Corporate Finance updated its Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations to explain
these new rules.
Private Placement Financing – Why is an “Exemption” So Important? In the U.S. companies
can only raise capital from investors if they either register their offering with the SEC or they
offer securities that are exempt from registration. Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act exempts
from registration “transactions by the issuer not requiring any public offering”. Rule 506 is a rule
under Regulation D that provides conditions that an issuer may rely on to meet the requirements
of the Section 4(a)(2) exemption. One of these conditions, and normally the one that causes most
problems with issuers, is that the issuer must not use any “general solicitation” to market the
securities. “General solicitation” includes advertisements, TV or radio communications, general
purpose seminars and the use of a company’s website to either offer securities or condition the
market to the offering of a security. Investors and the issuer’s Board of Directors are especially
concerned that the securities being issued are “exempt”, because if they do not meet the test of
“exemption” there is the possibility that investors will seek rescission (get their money back).
Consequently, the closing of most private placements require an “opinion of the issuer’s
counsel” that the offering is exempt. In our 20+ years’ experience with private placements, the
110
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34

most serious trip-wire has been that the issuer inadvertently “advertised” the offering and
therefore cannot close.
506(c) Changes the Game – But Watch Out. So if a company follows the precise details of Rule
506(c) (companies need to consult their securities counsel for details of how to qualify for and
document a 506(c) offering), it is able to offer securities only to accredited institutional and
individual investors (including VCs, high net worth individuals and family offices) with or
without a placement agent.111 And the
issuer can advertise the offering by whateverDecember
means2013
Hamilton Clark Research Report
including the company’s website. Companies have started doing this but we have not seen any
Another controversial issue with crowdfunding that has not been resolved is how to organize and
506(c) cleantech, sustainable or energy-tech
transactions
close
as ofto December
2013.
However,
regulate funding
portals as the way
for investors
actually send in their
money
and receive their
securities. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) which is a self-regulatory body that
what we (at Hamilton Clark) have seen
is
that
companies
are
attempting
to
self-develop
and
selfregulates about 4,000 securities firms and about 650,000 brokers in the U.S. is currently
studying
how
to regulate funding portals and is 112
expected to issue their ruling during 2014.
market transactions that, in our opinion, may not be fair to investors for a number of reasons
Summary Differences
(the proposed pre-money
Rule 506(c)
Crowdfunding
valuation may be substantially
Is it currently legal
Yes
No
higher than a typical VC or
Are there individual investor limits
No
Yes, but the guidelines have not yet
been issued
private equity financing, or the
Is advertising allowed
Yes. Companies can use any type of No. Guidelines have not yet been
terms of the offering may not
advertising including their website
issued but likely will only allow
companies to direct investors to a
be reflective of typical venture
funding portal
Is there a limit to how much can be
No
Yes, $1,000,000 per year
capital or private equity terms
raised
(for example, offering common
Who can participate
Accredited investors only
Both accredited and non-accredited
investors
stock rather than a senior series
Is a placement agent required
No. But many companies will likely A funding portal or a traditional
continue to use a placement agent to broker dealer will likely be required.
of convertible redeemable
mitigate “fairness” issues for their
Board members.
preferred stock, or issuing
Key issue to be resolved
Fairness of the transaction from a Less of an issue if a funding portal
financial point of view. We are likely or broker dealer has accepted
cheap stock to the founders)).
to see the use of a fairness opinion responsibility for due diligence,
like in M&A transactions in order to disclosure and valuation
In addition, disclosure pursuant
mitigate exposure to members of the
Board of Directors if a placement
to SEC Rule 10b-5may not be
agent is not used.
as comprehensive in the case of
Figure K-1. Summary of Key Requirement Differences
a self-developed and selfcorresponding to Rule 506(c) and Crowdfunding
marketed transaction as it
would be if a placement agent were to be used. These factors may place risk on the company’s
management and its Board of Directors.113
(4)
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(1)

Accredited investors include institutions (venture capital and private equity), and individual investors that have a net
worth of at least $1,000,000 (not including their primary residence), or annual income of $200,000 (or $300,000 with
spouse) and some assurance of continuing such income. The SEC has indicated that it may change these rules in
2014 to allow financially sophisticated investors to qualify. Rule 506(c) offerings require that the issuer verify this status.

(2)

A fairness opinion is a professional evaluation by an investment bank or other third party as to whether the terms of a
transaction are fair. It is rendered for a fee. They are typically issued when a company is being sold or entering into a
merger or divesting themselves of a substantial division of their business. They can also be required in private
transactions not involving a company that is traded on a public exchange. Controversy in financial and management
circles surrounds the question of the objectivity of fairness opinions, as one aspect of the duty of care in the fairness of
a transaction. In response, in the U.S., the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) issued its Rule 2290 to
require disclosure by its members to minimize abuses and this was approved in 2007 by the SEC.

(3)

Rule 10b-5 Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Practices, states that It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange, to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, to make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.

Accredited investors include institutions (venture capital and private equity), and individual investors that have
a net worth of at least $1,000,000 (not including their primary residence), or annual income of $200,000 (or
Hamilton Clarksuch
Sustainable
Capital, Inc.
is a member
FINRA
and SIPC, and that
is a registered
SEC change
broker dealer.
$300,000 with spouse) and some assurance of (4)
continuing
income.
The
SEC ofhas
indicated
it may
these rules in 2014 to allow financially sophisticated investors to qualify. Rule 506(c) offerings require that the
3
issuer verify this status.
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A fairness opinion is a professional evaluation by an investment bank or other third party as to whether the
terms of a transaction are fair. It is rendered for a fee. They are typically issued when a company is being sold or
entering into a merger or divesting themselves of a substantial division of their business. They can also be required
in private transactions not involving a company that is traded on a public exchange. Controversy in financial and
management circles surrounds the question of the objectivity of fairness opinions, as one aspect of the duty of care
in the fairness of a transaction. In response, in the U.S., the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)
issued its Rule 2290 to require disclosure by its members to minimize abuses and this was approved in 2007 by the
SEC.
113
Rule 10b-5 Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Practices, states that It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
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light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or to engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
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